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ARGUMENT
For the convenience of the Court, the argument in this Reply Brief mirrors that of Davis
County's Response Brief
L

MELODY'S NOTICE OF CLAIM SATISFIES ALL EXPRESS
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR A NOTICE OF CLAIM.
A.

Formally Serving An Employee Acting on Behalf of the Davis County
Clerk Constitutes Directing and Delivering a Notice of Claim to the
Clerk.

Melody Little's opening brief argues that no statutory language or other authority imposes
the requirement to name the Davis County Clerk on the Notice of Claim. In short, there cannot
be 'strict compliance' with a non-existent requirement. Davis County does not provide the Court
with authority demonstrating that a notice must be addressed to the County Clerk. Rather, the
County focuses primarily on the argument that "Plaintiff relies on facts that are clearly in dispute."
(Reply at p. 9). Davis County's position and recitation of facts address whether Pat Beckstead
did or did not receive the notice of claim. However, Davis County has not appealed the trial
court's ruling that genuine issues of fact remain regarding whether Pat Beckstead received notice
of claim. (R. 309). None of the facts and argument made by Davis County bear on the issue
before the Court: namely, whether formally serving an employee of the Davis County Clerk
operates to satisfy the direction and delivery of a notice of claim.
Importantly, Utah statutory law dictates that delivery to and acceptance by Ms. Beckstead
is the same as delivery to and acceptance by the Davis County Clerk.
(v) "Sheriff," "county attorney," "district attorney," "clerk" or other words used to denote
an executive or ministerial officer, may include any deputy, or other person performing the
duties of such officer, either generally or in special cases: and the words "county clerk"
may be held to include "clerk of the district court."
1

Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(v) (West 2003)(emphasis added).1
Here, Pat Beckstead performed the duties of County Clerk Steve Rawlins when
she accepted service on his behalf. Directing and delivering the notice of claim through
Pat Beckstead effectively directs and delivers notice of claim to Mr. Rawlins. By
formally serving Pat Beckstead, Melody strictly complied with the statutory requirement
that notice of claim be directed and delivered to the County Clerk.
The County further argues that Melody's notice is 'facially deficient' (Resp.
Brief at p. 12). Of course, the failure to name the Davis County Clerk would make the
notice 'facially deficient' if such a statutory prerequisite existed. However, the Notice
given by Melody provides ample indication of an intent to sue Davis County. The very
first line of the formally served paper states "NOTICE OF CLAIM." (R. 44). The notice
further states that "[pjursuant to law, Melody Little hereby gives notice of her intent to
file a lawsuit against you." (Id)(emphasis added). The you to which the notice refers is
one of either Davis County, Davis County Attorney, State of Utah, or Utah Attorney
1

Admittedly, neither counsel for Melody Little, Davis County nor the trial court
cited or discussed the statutory direction to consider Pat Beckstead the Davis County Clerk while
performing duties on his behalf. See, Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(v) (2003). However, the law
has long recognized that even though statutory authority is not cited to the trial court, it
may nonetheless be considered on appeal. Walker v. Lloyd, 4 N.E.2d 306, 308
(Mass. 1936)("fact that certain pertinent statutes of Vermont were not brought to the attention of
the trial judge does not preclude this courtfromconsidering decisions and statutes"); Wilson v.
Martinez, 307 P.2d 605, 605 (Wyo. 1957)(holding appellate court is "bound to notice" the ,
"relevant law of this state."); Peterson v. Paoli, 44 So.2d 639, 640 (Fla.l950)(Taking judicial
notice of applicable statute "even though such statute was overlooked in the proceedings in the
court below."). The simple failure by counsel for Little, counsel for Davis County and the
trial court itself to cite relevant statutory authority cannot provide a basis on which to
wholly ignore legislative enactments.
2

General. (Id). In other words, Melody directed and delivered a Notice of Claim to the
Davis County Clerk that which announced an intent to file suit against Davis County.
Accordingly, there is no 'facial deficiency' present in the notice. Concluding that
Melody Little failed to 'direct and deliver' a notice of claim perverts the notice
requirement beyond any statutory language. Because Melody satisfied the statutory
requirements for a notice of claim, the trial court's determination should be overturned and
Melody granted the opportunity to fully pursue her claim.
B.

The Notice Set Forth Damages As Far As Known and Sufficiently to
Allow Davis County to Investigate.

According to Davis County "Plaintiff testified she had completed treatment on her teeth
and arm in September 2000, but continued with physical therapy until February 2001." (Resp.
Brief at p. 12). The Notice of Claim was sent in October of 2000. (R. 44). By Davis County's
own recitation of facts, the injuries had not resolved to a point where an 'amount' could be placed
on damages because physical therapy continued for four months following the accident. Even
assuming that a specific dollar amount must be set forth in the notice of claim, under Davis
County's time line no definite amount could be determined in October of 2000 because the
physical therapy continued into February of 2001.
However, no statutory language requires that a specific dollar value be placed in a notice
of claim. Rather, the notice need only set forth the "damages incurred by the claimant so far as
they are known." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(iii) (West 2003). Moreover, Melody submitted
her claim a mere two months after the accident. The immediate notice gave Davis County not
only the opportunity to repair and correct the condition, thereby preventing other injuries, but

3

made it impossible to set forth a specific amount in damages so shortly after the accident.
Melody's notice of claim set forth the damages; a broken arm, damaged teeth and pain and
suffering, in a timely manner and sufficiently to comply with the statute.
H.

DAVIS COUNTY DEPRIVED LITTLE OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO
RESPOND BY RAISING A FACTUAL ARGUMENT FOR THE FIRST
TIME IN ITS REPLY BRIER

Davis County misconstrues Little's argument on this point. Davis County claims
that "Plaintiff argues the County 'waived' its right" to argue the notice of claim failed to
satisfy the damages requirement. (Resp. Brief at p. 12). However, nowhere in the
briefing did Little claim that Davis County 'waived' the right to this argument altogether.
Satisfaction of the notice of claim requirement is obviously a jurisdictional issue which
cannot be waived. Rather, Davis County's belated raising of a factual argument in its Reply
Memorandum deprived Little of the opportunity to respond with facts to the contrary, especially
where neither party had requested oral argument. Notably, this position differs from that of
Little's citation to Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12fs directive to consider Pat Beckstead as if she were
the Davis County Clerk while performing his duties. In that instance, the factual argument was
raised all along that Pat Beckstead held herself out as able to accept service. Affidavits and
counter-affidavits were presented to the court on the issue. Only the legal authority itself was
overlooked by all counsel involved, as well as the trial court.
When Davis County raised, for thefirsttime in its Reply Memorandum, that the damages
had not been sufficiently set forth, the maneuver deprived not only Little the opportunity to
respond, but also prevented the trial court from making a complete record on the issue.
Obviously Davis County may raise the argument on remand, but the opportunity to respond and
4

folly develop the factual record on the issue cannot be deprived simply by holding the argument
until a reply brief is filed. Accordingly, Little asks that this Court reject the argument that
damages were not sufficiently enumerated because no amount was included as a basis for
summary judgment and/or dismissal. Rather, if any question remains on the issue of whether
damages were sufficiently set forth, the matter should be subject to remand, not affirmance.
CONCLUSION
Davis County cites no authority for the proposition that the Notice of Claim must name or
be addressed to the Davis County Clerk. Nor does Davis County quote any language imposing
such a requirement. The same is true for the requirement that a Notice designate a specific
amount in damages. In effect, Davis County attempts to force 'strict compliance' with
requirements that simply do not exist in the statute. Following the County's logic, every time a
claimant failed to comply with a requirement dreamt up by the responsible governmental entity
that entity could escape liability. Such a narrow reading of the Governmental Immunity Act
ignores the warning not to judicially extend sovereign immunity. The County's reading also
ignores a statutory direction to read statutes liberally with the goal of effecting their purpose, in
this case affording a party injured by governmental negligence the opportunity to seek redress.
Because no statutory basis exists for the 'requirements' urged by the County, dismissal should be
reversed and Melody given the opportunity to seek redress for her injuries.
DATED: July 4, 2003

Peter W. Summerill
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